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Authors: George Daughan

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BOOK: 1812: The Navy's War
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WITHIN TEN MINUTES of receiving Hamilton’s latest message, Rodgers hoisted the signal to weigh anchor, and shortly thereafter the potent American squadron glided past the lighthouse on Sandy Hook and stood out into the Atlantic. If Rodgers remained at sea for any length of time, he would be acting contrary to Hamilton’s instructions. Nonetheless, he ignored his orders and set a course to intercept a huge Jamaica convoy of perhaps one hundred and ten merchantmen that regularly sailed during June and July from the Caribbean to England. Rodgers and Decatur agreed to split prize money evenly—a common practice.
The Jamaica convoy’s general route was well-known. Using the Gulf Stream and the prevailing southwesterly winds, the convoy would work up the Atlantic coast until it caught the westerlies north of Bermuda and use them to power it to England. The convoy would have escorts, of course. Since Parliament passed the Convoy Act in 1798, all British merchantmen were required to sail in protected convoys. But that didn’t faze Rodgers: His squadron would normally be much stronger than the men-of-war guarding the Jamaica convoy. If all went well, his fleet would capture or sink the escorting warships and then destroy or take much of the convoy as prizes. It would be the rousing start to the conflict that the administration hoped for but scarcely expected. And it would create a row in London; Parliament would want to know why the government had not anticipated war breaking out and positioned a squadron off New York to blockade Rodgers. At a minimum, disrupting the convoy would embarrass the Liverpool ministry.
 
 
WHILE RODGERS WAS putting out from New York, Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin wrote a hasty note to the president expressing concern that a significant percentage of the American merchant fleet—whose captains had no way of knowing war had been declared—were at sea and would be vulnerable to British attacks, particularly when they approached their home ports. Back on April 4, when Madison and Congress passed the ninety-day embargo on all shipments to Britain in order to pressure London, large numbers of American merchantmen put to sea before the law went into effect. Gallatin worried about the effect on the U.S. Treasury if it were deprived of the customs duties from these ships. He expected that “arrivals from foreign ports will for the coming four weeks average from one to one-and-a-half million dollars a week.” He considered it of the first importance that Madison direct the navy “to protect these and our coasting vessels, whilst the British have still an inferior force on our coasts.... I think orders to that effect, ordering them to cruise accordingly, ought to have been sent yesterday, and that, at all events, not one day longer ought to be lost. I will wait on you tomorrow at one o’clock.”
Gallatin had little difficulty convincing Madison, and on the following day, June 22, Hamilton wrote to Rodgers, ordering him to consider the returning American merchant fleet his first priority. To protect it, Rodgers was to take the
President
,
Essex
,
John Adams
,
Hornet
, and
Nautilus
on patrol from the Chesapeake Capes eastward, while Decatur patrolled from New York southward with the
United States
, the
Congress
, and the
Argus
. Hamilton expected the two squadrons to overlap somewhat, creating the possibility they might at times act in concert.
The orders appeared to be a compromise between Rodgers’s idea of a unified fleet and Decatur’s preference for a dispersed one, but they were actually based on Gallatin’s concerns and issued with little thought, since the president had no overall strategy. Fortunately, Rodgers did not receive Hamilton’s instructions for many weeks—after he returned from his cruise. If carried out, they would have left both squadrons so weak they would have been easy targets for the Halifax fleet. Neither Gallatin nor the president nor Hamilton, it would seem, considered that possibility.
 
 
AFTER HIS FRUSTRATING encounter with the
Belvidera
on June 23, Rodgers—with his broken leg in splints—continued hunting for the rich Jamaica convoy, repairing the
President
as he went. He had a good idea of where his prey was. Hours before running into the
Belvidera
, he had spoken with the American brig
Indian Chief
out of Madeira bound for New York. Her master reported that four days earlier he spotted a huge convoy—over a hundred ships, he thought—eastbound in latitude 36° north and longitude 67° west (just north of Bermuda). A frigate and a brig were escorting them.
Rodgers had no doubt that the ships the
Indian Chief
saw were the merchantmen he was after. The huge convoy had sailed from Negril Bay, Jamaica, on May 20 and passed the eastern tip of Cuba on June 4, guarded by the 36-gun frigate H.M.S.
Thalia
(Captain James Vashon) and the 18-gun sloop of war
Reindeer
(Captain Manners)—easy pickings for Rodgers. He estimated the convoy was only three hundred miles away.
 
 
ON JULY 3, while Rodgers was on the hunt, Captain David Porter put out to sea from New York in the restored
Essex.
The commandant of the New York Navy Yard in Brooklyn, Captain Isaac Chauncey, had brought the old frigate up to a high state of readiness, careening her, cleaning and repairing the copper bottom, caulking her inside and out, putting on a false keel, and replacing all the masts. Although she had been launched thirteen long years ago in Salem, Massachusetts, during the Quasi-War with France, she was ready for combat, and so was her skipper.
As he passed Sandy Hook and drove into the Atlantic, Captain Porter was in high spirits. No British squadron was about, and the day before, he had received his promotion to captain—after an inordinately long wait, he thought. His orders, dated June 24, directed him to join Rodgers’s squadron, but it was nowhere in sight, and Porter was glad of it. He’d rather be on his own, free to conduct the hunt as he saw fit, without being under Rodgers’s thumb, having to share laurels and prize money.
If Porter failed to find Rodgers, his orders directed him to patrol between Bermuda and Newfoundland’s Grand Banks. Eight days out from Sandy Hook, on July 11, the
Essex
was in latitude 33° north and longitude 66° west—northeast of the Bermudas—when at two o’clock in the morning a lookout glimpsed the vague outlines of eight ships in the distance, running northward. Porter was out of bed and on deck in a hurry. He grabbed a telescope, and with the moon providing some hazy light, he counted seven troop transports, with a frigate as an escort. The vessels were spread apart in loose formation typical of convoys in which ships sailed at different speeds.
Porter decided to attack the rearmost vessel and cut her out in hopes of provoking a fight with the frigate. As the
Essex
closed in, the armed transport
Samuel & Sarah
—carrying 197 soldiers—did not attempt to escape. Porter had the weather gauge, and when he fired a single shot across her bow, she hauled down her colors. Her skipper assumed his escorting frigate, the 32-gun
Minerva
(Captain Richard Hawkins), would quickly engage the enemy.
By then it was 4 A.M., and, as expected, the
Minerva
broke away from the convoy and steered toward the
Essex.
Within a short time, however, she inexplicably came about and returned to the middle of the troop transports. Porter was puzzled. He was eager for a fight; the two frigates appeared evenly matched. He could not understand why Hawkins did not accept his challenge. Instead, the
Minerva
drew the remaining armed transports around her, so they could act in consort, and sailed on, daring Porter to approach.
Captain Hawkins’s orders were to transport the First Regiment of Royal Scots infantrymen from Barbados to Quebec and reinforce the small Canadian army. He probably judged it more important to accomplish his mission than to take on the
Essex
, although he must have wanted to. Except in extraordinary circumstances, no British captain would avoid fighting an American of equal strength. Doing so would earn him a court-martial and severe punishment.
With the odds now heavily against him, Porter decided it would be suicide to fight the entire convoy and settled for just taking the
Samuel & Sarah
. The number of men she had on board presented a problem, however. Porter did not want to be encumbered by so many prisoners. After throwing her armament overboard, he released the transport and all the soldiers on parole with a ransom bond of $14,000 and continued his cruise.
 
 
WHILE RODGERS AND Porter were off hunting in the mid-Atlantic, Commodore Philip B.V. Broke’s Halifax squadron arrived off Sandy Hook on July 14, only to discover that Rodgers’s fleet was gone and the
Essex
nowhere in sight. Broke’s task force was formidable; it consisted of his flagship, the 38-gun frigate
Shannon
, the 64-gun battleship
Africa
(Captain John Bastard), the 38-gun
Guerriere
(Captain James R. Dacres), the 32-gun
Aeolus
(Captain Lord James Townsend), and the 36-gun
Belvidera
—fully recovered from her run-in with Rodgers and still under Captain Richard Byron.
Two days later, Broke happened on the 12-gun American brig
Nautilus
, under Lieutenant William Crane, who had sailed out of New York on July 15, passing Sandy Hook at 6 P.M. with a fresh, squally wind out of the northeast. At 4 the following morning Crane was seventy-five miles off Sandy Hook when he spied Broke’s squadron two points off his weather beam. He immediately wore ship, “turned out the reefs and made all sail the vessel would bear.”
Crane was carrying yet more orders from Secretary Hamilton to Rodgers dated July 10. They read: “There will be a strong British force on our coast in a few days—be upon your guard—we are anxious for your safe return into port.” This was a far cry from Hamilton’s bombastic “strike a good blow” of a month earlier, when war had not actually been declared. When the declaration was made official on June 18, he toned down his aggressive talk and became more cautious. The new orders were apparently meant to keep the American fleet safe in New York and not have it out patrolling. Hamilton’s lack of consistency was for the most part caused by Madison’s continued indecision about naval strategy.
As soon as Broke spotted the
Nautilus
, he bore up and made all sail in chase, displaying American colors. A heavy swell from the north slowed the
Nautilus
and gave the bigger ships an edge. When Broke closed in, he made recognition signals that Crane did not understand. At the same time, Crane hoisted his own private signal and ensign, which Broke did not answer. Not that Crane expected him to; it had been clear from the beginning that this was a British squadron.
Crane was forced to take in sail to preserve spars, while Broke continued to gain. “Every maneuver in trimming ship was tried,” Crane reported, “but this not having the desired effect I ordered the anchors cut from the bows.” Nothing helped. “At nine o’clock the wind became lighter, and the brig labored excessively in the swell.”
With Broke closing in, Crane threw overboard part of his water, the lee guns, and a portion of his round shot. Instantly, the
Nautilus
was relieved and bore her sail with greater ease. But Broke continued to close. By 11 the
Shannon
had pulled within cannon shot, and for some unknown reason, Broke hoisted French colors but held his fire. Seeing no need to destroy the
Nautilus
, he kept pressing forward. At midnight he was within musket shot.
Knowing he could not escape, Crane destroyed his signal books and the dispatches for Rodgers. He then consulted his principal officers and decided to surrender. Crane took in the studding sails and light sails, trained the weather guns aft, and put the helm alee. Broke responded by putting the
Shannon
’s helm up, hoisting a broad pendant and British colors, and ranging up under the
Nautilus
’s lee quarter to accept Crane’s surrender.
In short order, the
Shannon
’s boats rowed over to take possession of the
Nautilus
. They returned later with Lieutenant Crane, who had a strained chat with his captor. Broke then put the officers and crew of the
Nautilus
in the battleship
Africa
, except for Crane, whom he sent back to the
Nautilus
as a lone prisoner with a British prize crew. The
Nautilus
was the first British capture of the war, and for the time being, Broke made her part of his squadron.
 
 
WHILE BROKE WAS corralling the
Nautilus
, Captain Isaac Hull was at sea in the newly refurbished
Constitution
, sailing from Chesapeake Bay to New York with orders to join Rodgers and Decatur. Hull departed the Chesapeake Capes on Sunday morning, July 12, with a fine southwesterly breeze, expecting to be off Sandy Hook within five days. His latest orders showed that the president and Secretary Hamilton were still confused about strategy. Rodgers had already left New York, which Hamilton had had time to learn, and he also knew a powerful British squadron was sailing down from Halifax to the New York area. Nonetheless, Hamilton ordered Hull to sail directly into the jaws of Broke’s fleet and certain disaster. “If . . . you fall in with an enemy vessel,” Hamilton wrote, “you will be guided in your proceedings by your own judgment, bearing in mind, however, that you are not voluntarily to encounter a force superior to your own. On your arrival at New York, you will report yourself to Commodore Rodgers. If he should not be in port, you will remain there till further orders.”
BOOK: 1812: The Navy's War
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