Churchill's White Rabbit (6 page)

Forest now tried to move himself into MI9 – the division responsible for escape lines within France – and had even been interviewed, but it was a chance meeting with a member of the newest secret organisation, SOE, that sealed his fate for the rest of the war. It was while visiting friends among the French forces at their offices at St James’s Square that he was introduced to Captain Eric Piquet-Wicks. It can be imagined that this meeting was contrived by his French contacts who knew of Forest’s frustration at being so ‘out’ of the fight. But whatever the case, this short conversation with Piquet-Wicks made such an impression on the captain that the course of Forest’s war changed forever.

Notes

1
.  Marshal, B.,
The White Rabbit
.

2
.  
Ibid.

3
.  Perrault, G.,
Paris Under the Occupation
.

4
.  MacKenzie, W.,
The Secret History of SOE
.

5
.  In Marshal,
Op cit
.

– 5 –

An Ungentlemanly Type of War

THERE WAS ALWAYS A notion among certain layers of the British military that war had conventions. There were rules to be followed that governed what was and was not allowed; to break them was considered not only ungentlemanly but simply not British. To a modern mind some of these restrictions seem incomprehensible and it is frightening to think that many significant decisions of the Second World War were based on the principles of warfare from the past – principles that no longer made sense in the first modern conflict.

One of the difficulties that British authorities struggled with was the idea of ‘subversion’. Spies and the intelligence service as an organised body was a relatively new concept, as was the notion that they were official, recognised by the government and had their own legitimate department. Gathering information from the enemy and occupied countries was one thing, and perfectly acceptable as a logical consequence of war, but sneaking in fellows undercover to stir up trouble among the locals stuck in the throat of many upper-level staff.

The only secret services prior to the war were MI5 and MI6. They were officially inaugurated in 1909 by a Cabinet decision and spent the interwar years watching over the tangled politics of Europe and, closer to home, those of Northern Ireland.

The ‘Fifth Column’ scare began to change everything in 1938 when governments started to look at their own people with suspicion. The idea that large numbers of citizens could be working undercover for the enemy was frightening simply in its intangible nature. Today we know that the Fifth Column scare was just that, a scare hyped out of all proportion, but step back to 1938 and it seemed very different. Anything seemed possible as the Nazi machine rumbled into action.

When conflict became inevitable in 1939 it was necessary to arrange for special divisions to deal with the new problems that open war would cause. Among these newly formed departments was the inappropriately titled Government Code and Cipher School (they deciphered intercepted messages but did no teaching), the Radio Security Service and MI9, which was set up at Christmas to organise escape routes for Allied airmen and refugees from enemy countries. There was also a deception service covered by the meaningless title of London Controlling Section.

All this was legitimate intelligence activity; intercepting and deciphering communications and rescuing individuals from enemy hands was a perfectly acceptable aspect of warfare and one that did not trouble any ministers when they went to bed at night. Indeed they could feel pleased that the sophistication of these departments was outwitting Jerry time and time again.

The real problem came from those at the forefront of intelligence work who realised that defensive security was not enough in this new, ever-changing wartime climate. As early as a year before Hitler invaded Poland, some sections of Whitehall were quietly investigating the possibilities of propaganda, subversion and sabotage, and their potential effects on the enemy. The War Office, Foreign Office and MI6 all had secret departments, unacknowledged and unofficial, working on these topics. The idea of this secretive, yet aggressive, warfare was anathema to politicians and government officials that it was kept hidden even from them.

Those at the heart of the intelligence services knew that the old rules of warfare were long lost and that if they didn’t take advantage of undercover agents, rebel movements and stirring up popular dissent, then the Germans certainly would. Spies and double agents were a constant threat to Britain; it was only because the Abwehr (the German counter-intelligence force) were as much novices at the game as the British that they never posed a real threat.

In 1940 it was decided that a separate organisation was needed to deal with the three unpopular intelligence sub-divisions (propaganda, subversion, sabotage). The fledgling groups would eventually form into SOE (Special Operations Executive), but to begin with they were a mixed bag of departments. Section D, which became a part of it, was stolen from MI6, much to the displeasure of the head of that department who was not informed of the change for three weeks. There were also problems with overlaps: MI6 felt that SOE were stepping on their toes when it came to intelligence gathering and MI9 wondered if their role as an escape routes department was about to be subverted.

Everything was a bit rushed and nobody was entirely clear on what they were supposed to be doing. The departments shaped up with time and eventually divided into F Section (sabotage in France usually by non-French agents), DF Section (escape routes), EU/P Section (worked exclusively among Polish speakers), AMF Section (operated in Algiers for only twenty months between 1943 and 1944), Jedburgh Section (only uniformed operatives sent in during Operation Overlord to reinforce the Maquis in France and hold up the German forces), and lastly RF Section (a subversive movement that worked to reinforce French opinions against the Germans and Vichy government, and assisted the resistance).
¹

A splinter group, PWE (Political Warfare Executive) to which fell tasks of ‘black’ propaganda and rumour mongering, broke away from SOE. There was always rivalry between the two branches and they never co-existed well.

While all of this was going on, Parliament was kept in the dark. The new secret service was so controversial that it was not possible to admit its existence to Parliament and certainly not to the press.
²
However, the organisation did capture the imagination and attention of the new prime minister, Winston Churchill. He had always been a progressive thinker when it came to the war and was not averse to playing a little dirty. He liked the concept of SOE, as did the Civil Service’s principal strategic expert, Lord Hankey. Churchill ensured that a document officially creating SOE was drawn up by his predecessor Neville Chamberlain just before Chamberlain’s death.

SOE had a simple agenda: to develop an underground resistance movement among the local population that would disrupt Nazi influence and control. This could be done by simply spreading information and keeping up morale or by taking risky acts of sabotage to hamper the Germans. There was a greater risk to the general population by the latter action, as the Nazis would initiate fierce reprisals for any act of destruction. While this was not a matter to be taken lightly, reprisals almost universally had the effect of stirring up more resistance and strengthening that which already existed.

While their objective was simple, putting it into effect was much more complex. For a start the resistance movements that had already formed in France were divided by their political ideas as much as by their operating methods. The biggest factor in this was General de Gaulle, who on the one hand was useful for stirring up people to fight back, but on the other often divided potential comrades.

It would be a mistake to believe that de Gaulle was universally popular among the French, as nothing in politics is ever that easy. France has always been a hotbed for political debate and contention and the war only interrupted that for a matter of months until it resurfaced within the underground. While the majority of resisters despised Pétain for ‘kissing up’ to the Nazis, there was just as many who despised de Gaulle and did not want to fight off the Germans just to get him into power; they also found it difficult to fight alongside ‘Gaullists’ who were now part of the Free French Independents (FFI). Add to that de Gaulle’s own personal dislike for various resistance elements and his refusal to aid them in any way, and the situation soon became unmanageable. Also in the mix were the French Communists, with connections to Russia. It was feared that they were working to see the Soviets take control of France. And let’s not forget the Maquis, the men who had fled to various mountainous and forested regions to escape being sent to Germany as forced labour. They lived permanently outdoors and in hiding, but built stocks of weapons and practiced guerrilla warfare.

Somehow SOE had to bring together these differing groups to form a unified resistance. They didn’t have to like each other, but they must not conflict or hamper each other’s efforts. This would prove the full-time job of RF Section, and would cause a great deal of argument among the politicians back home, not least the Foreign Office, which was trying to keep on reasonable terms with Pétain.

In warfare, nothing is as simple as it seems.

Meanwhile, Forest was trying to find his way back into France via the intelligence services. He had been interviewed for employment within MI9 in December 1941 and then shortly after by Captain Strong of MI5. After his chance meeting with Piquet-Wicks he was sent to Boodle’s Club for another interview, this time by Major David Keswick. It was remarked that he gave ‘a favourable impression.’
³
The resulting papers from the interview reveal revelations about Forest’s personal life and affairs.

They record that Forest’s wife and two children were still in France and being looked after by his former employer Molyneux;
⁴
Barbara was unmentioned. Forest listed Lillian’s address as rue de la Pointe and stated that she was the person named in his will. He also gave his religion as Calvinist (a branch of Christianity named after French reformer John Calvin), though later writings and records suggest that he was more inclined towards atheism. Intriguingly he claimed he had no political views, which seems oddly neutral for a man normally so full of opinions, but was perhaps a tactic for ensuring that he wasn’t disqualified from service by favouring the wrong party line.

Barbara finally received a mention under section 23 – ‘First Person to be informed if you become a casualty’ – where her original surname, Dean, was tactfully written in. Under his personal particulars Forest gave his description as thickset, blue-eyed and fair-haired; he could almost be imagined as having German ancestry. He also mentioned that the third finger on his left hand was ‘defective’ but this did not prevent him from being able to shoot, mountaineer, swim or box, all things that the SOE interview asked if he could do.

When it came to promoting his usefulness to SOE, Forest was not a shrinking violet and when asked which areas of France he was familiar with he bluntly responded ‘all’. He also made it clear that he had many contacts within France, both personal and professional, which he could use in his secret work. How much of this was accurate and how much was a ploy to ensure that he was employed by SOE is only known to Forest; he was indeed widely travelled and knowledgeable about France, but whether his fashion industry contacts could have been any use to the resistance is debatable. Forest was not afraid to promote his own self-interests if it meant getting into the service.

He told his new potential employers that he had been approached by MI9 (rather than him approaching them) but had come to the conclusion that he could do more for SOE. This was actually quite true as he was exactly the type of individual the fledgling SOE needed for their work with the resistance. He was therefore already being interviewed with a mind to being placed in the RF Section of the organisation.

SOE liked the determined and dogmatic Forest, and after a final check into his background run by MI5 they were keen to offer him a place. But as usual in Forest’s life nothing was ever that simple. The Air Ministry kicked up a fuss about losing one of their own. The RAF and SOE never had an easy relationship: SOE was reliant on RAF aircraft to transfer their agents in and out of various countries, but the missions were not only time away from bombing raids for the pilots and planes involved, but were also high risk.

With unhappy relations between the two organisations it was unsurprising that the RAF made a fuss about Forest’s transfer; it was not so much that Forest was indispensable to them, but that they were disinclined to respond favourably to any SOE request.

Forest was furious. After so long trying to achieve his goal he had been thwarted by petty bureaucracy and internal politics. It had been a long time coming, but Forest finally exploded. He demanded to be released from the RAF, threatening to go to the national press and tell his story if he was not allowed his transfer. SOE, meanwhile, tried to stay in the background, not wanting to sour relations further between themselves and the RAF. Forest was therefore alone in his battle, but that had never bothered him and he kept pestering the Air Ministry until finally they relented and on 3 February 1942, Forest joined SOE.