Destroy Carthage (21 page)
Such was the position in the year 221, when Hasdrubal's
death brought a Barca to power again in Punic Spain. Hannibal,
the eldest of Hamilcar's four sons, had been too young to take
command on his father's death. Now twenty-five, he was the
choice of the army in the peninsula and the popular assembly
at Carthage. According to Livy, Hannibal had been made to
swear undying enmity to Rome by his father. Be that as it
may (and it does not seem improbable), no man was to kindle
more hatred in the Romans; none more nearly eradicate the
Roman state.
Beyond the Alps
Long
after the destruction of Carthage the memory of
Hannibal haunted the Romans. To Horace he was 'the perfidious,' the 'dread Hannibal,' likened to a wrecking storm or a
forest fire. Neither calumny nor the belittlement of his skills
exorcized the ghost. Little wonder that the generation of Cato,
which fought him, or the children who absorbed its tales, were
apprehensive of the city which produced his kind.
The Second Punic War - the War of Hannibal as the Romans
called it - remains one episode in Carthaginian history known
to everyone, needing slight evocation in these pages. The
famous march through the Alps has passed into legend along
with many tales of the ordeals encountered there.
Responsibility for the war is arguable. For some time the
Romans had encouraged a friendly administration in the
Iberian port of Saguntum, perceiving its potential as a bridgehead in eastern Spain. Claiming that the place was under their
protection, they threatened war should Hannibal lay siege to
it. Two years after succeeding Hasdrubal, he did just that.
Saguntum, well to the south of the Ebro, was now the only
town in the province which resisted him. It was not in the
sphere denied Punic troops by the Roman treaty (i.e., north
of the Ebro), nor is there evidence that Rome reserved special
rights at Saguntum by any agreement.
But if Rome's ultimatum had no basis in legality, Hannibal's
contempt for it scarcely showed aversion for the war he risked.
A renewal of the struggle with Rome was implicit not only in
his heritage but in his conviction that, from Spain, he could
succeed where Carthage had failed before. He would do so
by striking at the heart of Rome's power, her dominion in
Italy, looking to the Italians to cast off her yoke and take side
with him.
By crossing the Ebro in early summer 218, Hannibal anticipated the declaration of war already resolved in Rome. Securing the northeast passage of Spain in a few weeks, he passed
the Pyrenees near the coast into southern France, reaching the
Rhone late in August. Many Gallic recruits joined his army,
the rest of which was mainly of Spaniards and Africans.
Among its best units were the bands of Numidian horsemen
whose aggression and endurance were unexcelled. There was
also Spanish cavalry. Distinct from the Numidians, who liked
to lead remounts into battle and change ponies when one
tired, the Iberians commonly rode two men to a horse, one
rider dismounting to fight on foot. Of interest in the foot ranks
were Balearian slingers, renowned for their aim with lead or
stone missiles. Armed with two types of sling - for long range
and short range - their fire could be more withering than that
of ancient bowmen.
Rome cast her first challenge to Hannibal on the Rhone.
Disembarking at Massilia, the Scipio brothers Publius Cornelius
(father of 'Africanus') and Gnaeus deployed their forces on the
right bank only to find that Hannibal had already crossed the
river and eluded them. Rather than ship the army beyond the
Alps to meet the enemy, the Scipios now took a gamble.
While Publius sailed alone for Pisa to alert northern Italy,
Gnaeus proceeded with the fleet and army to eastern Spain,
where Hannibal's young brother Hasdrubal Barca now held
command. The Roman invasion of Spain at this moment, if
remote from the main drama, would be seen in due course as
a telling move.
Hannibal descended from the Alps to the Po lands, seemingly
by the Dora Riparia, with 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry.
The mountain crossing, though an impressive achievement,
was not unique, for the warlike tribes of Gaul had done it
many times. Nor did elephants, inseparable from Hannibal
in popular imagination, play a major role. Only 37 began the
trek, far fewer than those deployed by Carthage in earlier
campaigns.
Legend has overdone the hardships. That more than 50,000
men - the traditional estimate
-
were lost between the Ebro
and the Po is inconceivable in the light of Hannibal's competence. The speed and success with which he took the offensive in northern Italy points to a force in good shape and heart,
not the remnants of a marathon massacre. Almost at once,
the invaders overwhelmed the stronghold of the hostile Taurini
Gauls, then, gathering friendly tribes, moved down the Po
toward the newly-formed Roman colonies of Placentia
(Piacenza) and Cremona.
Scipio, having taken command of two legions in the area,
had advanced to a northern tributary, the Ticino. Here, a
cavalry skirmish, demonstrating the superiority of the Numid-
ians over the Roman horse, led to the injury of Scipio, who
withdrew south of the Po to the Trebia. He was now reinforced
by some 20,000 troops under his fellow consul Tiberius
Sempronius, hot-foot from Sicily and an impending blow at
Africa.
It was December. The water was icy as Sempronius threw
his legions across the Trebia and into the first major battle
for Italy. At the end of the day, no more than 10,000 legionaries scrambled back through the stream to Placentia. The
greater part of the Roman force was dead or captured.
Sempronius, pleading storm and flood to excuse himself, ignored the fact that he had been out-manoeuvred at every stage
on ground picked by Hannibal precisely for its natural snares.
Trebia closed a momentous year with the Carthaginian
commanding most of the territory north of the Appenines,
through which he could choose his passage the next spring.
The campaign had won to his side not only a host of anti-
Roman Celts but a number who had formerly served Rome.
Above all, it had fulfilled the strategic purpose of averting an
offensive against Carthage by concentrating Roman forces in
the north. The new year would find Rome on the defensive in
Italy.
Two armies were posted to check a Punic advance south,
one on the east coast at Ariminum (Rimini), the other across
the Appenines at Arretium (Arezzo). Hannibal, having wintered at Bologna, avoided both by what Polybius termed 'a
difficult short cut'- probably the Collina pass and the marshes
of the Arno, then in spring flood - to appear in Etruria.
While the Carthaginian marched boldly through the northeast, the Roman commander at Arretium, Gaius Flaminius,
stood by inactively. Polybius characterises Flaminius as a military nincompoop, but he was perhaps not unwise in delaying
an attack on Hannibal until his colleague at Ariminum,
Gnaeus Servilius, might join him. Servilius was in fact approaching by forced marches when Hannibal, having swung
round Arretium, headed back into the hills as if making to
challenge the advancing force.
At last Flaminius felt safe in following. He had reached the
north shore of Lake Trasimene, and was marching in morning
mist through the narrow Borghetto pass, when he beheld the
trap set for him. Hannibal had placed his troops in ambush
during the night. At a signal, they attacked from all sides,
blocking the pass and swarming down the valley slopes. The
Romans, caught in line of march, had no chance. Flaminius was
killed, his army massacred.
Servilius, unable to get his main force near enough to help,
had sent 4,000 mounted troops ahead. Somewhere near Assisi,
the contingent was intercepted by Hannibal's cavalry leader,
Maharbal, and wiped out.
News of the defeats produced consternation at Rome. The
elderly senator Fabius Maximus was appointed dictator in the
crisis, religious invocations were intensified, defences strengthened. But Hannibal avoided Rome. His army was sore and
weary. Veering east to the Adriatic plains, the invaders rested
during mid-summer, bathing their wounds, then resumed campaigning to the south, ravaging Apulia and Campania.Fabius took the prudent view that Hannibal and his army
were too good to be confronted in full array. Instead, the dictator adopted a policy of attrition, dogging the enemy's movements, harassing detachments and supply details. On no
account was battle to be offered on equal terms, or on the
terms of Hannibal. Roman impatience, aroused by Fabian
strategy, was not mollified by the audacity with which the
enemy outwitted his shadowers.
In the most famous instance of Hannibalic ingenuity, the
Callicula pass engagement, the general extricated his force
from ambush by stampeding cattle toward the Romans after
dark. By 216, frustration at Rome, expressed in demands for
decisive action, was preparing the ground for Hannibal's third,
and last, great victory.
Early in June, seeking provisions, the invaders seized a
Roman supply base at Cannae, near the Ofanto river. Here,
they were approached by the consuls of the year, Lucius
Aemilius Paulus and Gaius Terentius Varra, with a Roman
army of impressive strength. Even allowing for exaggeration
in the traditional estimate of 80,000 men, it probably exceeded
Hannibal's 50,000, and certainly preponderated in infantry. In
cavalry, the Carthaginians were stronger.
Authorized to give battle by a senate tired of Fabian caution,
the Romans took position beside the Ofanto in customary order: cavalry and allied contingents on the wings, heavy
legions in the centre. Hannibal confronted the enemy with
his centre advanced and the line drawn back on either side, a
crescent with horns pointing to the rear. To the front were
Gauls and Spaniards; on their flanks, Africans. His cavalry engaged the Roman wings.
