Destroy Carthage (5 page)
Here lay the basic appeal of a third group, the 'democratic'
party of Roman designation, though essentially nationalist.
Its leaders, men of rank who based their platform on mass
support, spoke alike against the encroachments of Masinissa
and the travesty of Roman mediation. Disposed toward self-
defence rather than dependance, their advocacy gained adherents with every futile appeal to Rome.
From about 160, Carthaginian government, under popular
pressure, adopted a more militant approach to Numidia. The
dangers of resisting her intrusions were evident, but the provocation had ceased to be endurable. Among a series of border
skirmishes, a raid into usurped territory won acclaim in
Carthage for its leader, one Carthalo of the democratic faction.
Shortly afterwards, his party formed the government.
Still, the formalities of appeal to Rome were not abandoned.
Around 155, Masinissa demonstrated unprecedented audacity,
occupying the plains of Souk el Kremis immediately inland
of Carthage, well inside the frontier of Scipio. When the
outraged Carthaginians informed the Roman senate, yet
another commission of inquiry sailed for Africa. It was to
prove of grim significance. At its head, eighty-one years of
age, travelled Marcus Porcius Cato.
'Delenda est Carthago'
Probably
in the summer of 153, the senatorial commission's
galley and escort ships stood south for Africa, a voyage into
memory for the indomitable old man of Roman politics. Half
a century had passed since Cato fought at Zama. A generation
had reached middle-age knowing nothing at first hand of the
Hannibalic war and its horrors.
Italian trade with Carthage was once more considerable.
Pliny described the founders of the city, the Phoenicians, as the
inventors of commerce, and it was as a dealer, to be knocked
down in the market rather than on the battlefield, that the
world of the 2nd century
b.c.
saw the average Carthaginian.
His commercial acumen, execrated by some, was widely envied.
As an alien entrepreneur in the ports of many countries,
the Carthaginian was a tempting butt for national humour.
Menander, Alexis and Plautus depicted him in plays as a comic
turn. In the comedy
Voenulus,
Plautus, who died eighteen years
after Zama, portrayed a Carthaginian merchant named Hanno
as a self-confessed 'arch-rogue,' ready to turn anything to
quick profit: a
gugga,
a shady character living on his quick
wits.
Nevertheless, the fictional Hanno had good qualities. Plautus
made him a fond father, a kindly relative, a loyal friend. As a
pious man, he thanked the gods for his good fortune. So far as
he reflected a Roman image of his race, it was, if less than
flattering, hardly fraught with animosity.
There were Romans, of course, who took a harsher view.
Many old enough to recall the terror and turmoil of Hannibal's
invasion retained a bitterness modified but not dispelled by
time. Cato had a particularly unforgiving nature. The situation
he discovered on returning to Africa stirred a deep resentment
in him, a hatred born of the campaigns of his young manhood.
The extent of Carthage's recovery from defeat and the impositions of 201 was something of an economic miracle. Within
ten years, the city had felt able to pay off the war indemnity
in full, though an offer to do so had been refused by the
Romans, who preferred to prolong her obligation by the instalments already planned. In part, the revival was made possible by Hannibal's reforms, especially the steps against
corruption.
There had also been an important effort to offset the loss of
Carthaginian colonies in Spain by intensifying the productivity
of the city's fertile, but hitherto underdeveloped, agricultural
lands in Africa. At sea, a vigorous merchant service plied east
to Syrian, Egyptian and Hellenic markets; west to Morocco,
and to Gades (Cadiz) on the Atlantic coast of Spain. Trade
with Italy was brisk. Other factors had played a part in the
revival of prosperity.
Little of the Second Punic War had been fought in Africa.
As Cato might well reflect, it was the Italian lands of the victor
which had endured the greatest depredations. Anomalously,
the lands of the vanquished state had suffered relatively slight
damage. Nor had the manpower losses of Carthage in the
war equalled those of Rome.
Carthaginian armies were largely mercenary, recruited externally by officials who travelled widely, often to remote
parts, to contract with local leaders for their warriors. Carthage herself maintained a legion of young men of high birth
to provide an officer reserve. Apart from members of this
group, the casualties of her wars were mainly foreigners.
By contrast, the Roman army still depended on the old
citizen levy, property-holders liable for service of up to six
years at a stretch during sixteen years of manhood. Mobilization not only jeopardized businesses and livelihoods, but also
robbed the state of its most adventurous and patriotic citizens.
Prosperity diminished. As the 2nd century progressed, this
system had come under mounting stress.
When Cato led his commission to Africa, Roman supremacy
of the ancient world, a situation arising more from adept handling of a series of crises than by deliberate projection, was a
new phenomenon with many probationary problems. It should
not be imagined in terms of the established Roman empire of
the later republic, let alone of the principate. Roman sway in
the autumnal years of Cato was uneven, extemporary, sometimes savagely contested.
In the East, Rome had driven Antiochus from Asia Minor
and abolished the monarchy of Macedon. She had 'liberated'
the Greek states. A rich but weak Egypt looked for her protection. While none doubted that the Romans could deploy
their armies anywhere, the imperial administration of eastern
territories had yet to come. Meanwhile, an exacting patronage
brought protests. Within a few years, the Macedonians and
the Achaean League of Greece would be up in arms.
In the West, Rome's provinces in Corsica, Sicily, Sardinia
and Spain, all captured from Carthage, were sketchily supervised. Of many rebellions and incomplete conquests, the wars
in Spain most severely taxed the Roman government. Their
bearing on its increasing irascibility as the century advanced
is significant.
At first impression, the lands wrested from Carthage in the
Spanish peninsula had looked favourable. Passing down the
eastern coast region, then through the flourishing south toward
Gades, the new masters had found mineral and agricultural
prosperity. Here, where Carthaginian influence was most
marked, the inhabitants had acquired some sophistication.
But when it came to the rest, the outlook was bleak.
Mountains, forests and arid plains, combining with the fierce
reputation of tribes which the Carthaginians had not disturbed,
contributed to a general picture of inhospitability. Roman
geographers described the typical Iberians, as they knew the
peninsula people, as swarthy and tousle-haired, slight, wiry
and pugnacious, practised horsemen and bold, fanatical
fighters. Some lived in walled towns, others in more primitive
mountain and forest communities. Local pride and independence of spirit were placed by many before their own lives
and the lives of their families. 'Their bodies inured to abstinence and toil, their minds composed against death . . . they
prefer war to ease and, should they lack foes without, seek
them within. Rather than betray a secret they will often die
under torment,' declared a Roman commentator.
Stories were told of mothers who murdered their children
to prevent their falling into enemy hands; of prisoners who
killed themselves rather than endure slavedom; of patriots
who chanted songs of victory while being crucified by the
Romans.
Few needed any introduction to violence. For many, including the Celtiberian tribes of the interior and the so-called
Lusitanians of what is now central Portugal, the normal way of
life was warlike and predatory. Sturdily-mounted, trained from
childhood to find their mark with javelin and sling, the Iberians
posed an awesome problem for the Romans. In the areas of
Carthaginian penetration, the tribes had learned military
lessons from their former enemies, including the advantages
of solidarity against a common foe.
Rome's response to this awkward, if temporary, obstacle to
expansion was in keeping with the change in her foreign outlook. Initially, the Roman authorities in Spain, represented
by Sempronius Gracchus, son-in-law of Scipio, had employed
constructive diplomacy with fair success. Later officials
brought a new mood of self-importance and arrogance. Blustering in their demands, peremptory in use of force, they quickly
provoked hot resistance.
Wild terrain and the unnerving guerilla tactics of the natives
upset the Romans. Normal campaigns devolving on the siege
of a rich city, or the decisive set-piece battle, were their forte;
protracted colonial warfare was another thing. It required regular troops, experienced men led by good generals. It got
neither. Inflated Roman commanders, fearful for their reputations, resorted to cruelty and treachery to gain their ends.
They only inflamed the opposition. Within thirty years of the defeat of Carthage, Rome had
drafted 150,000 recruits to Spain, and the worst was still
ahead. In 154, the year before Cato sailed to Africa, the most
accomplished and impassioned of Iberian warriors, the Lusitanians, revolted under a dedicated leader named Viriatus. From
his mountain hideouts, Viriatus waged remorseless war against
the legions, outwitting the best of their captains.
One Roman governor, Galba, was reduced to the particularly contemptible ruse of pretending to grant a truce in order
to lure the Lusitanians from the hills to their grazing lands,
where he conducted a pitiless massacre. Another general,
Caepio, unable to beat Viriatus in battle, plotted his murder
by bribery. Joined by the Celtiberians, the Lusitanians fought
on.
