Napoleon III and the French Second Empire (6 page)

Bonapartist military dictatorship were short lived. The acts of resistance to the coup were taken to confirm its necessity as a means of preventing a future socialist revolution. According to Morny (quoted in Dansett 1961: 366), the insurrections were clear evidence of the ‘social war which would have broken out in 1852’.

Grossly exaggerated accounts of
démoc-soc
atrocities (the murder and mutilation of gendarmes, pillage and rape) and presentation of the insurrections as a form of mindless violence (
jacquerie
) were used to heighten conservative fears. After long years of economic crisis and political instability, the promise of strong government proved to be attractive to many people. Whatever their political principles, monarchist notables rallied to the cause of social order (or at least remained silent).

The Church gave thanks for deliverance with solemn
Te Deums
. Salvation, in the short term at least, clearly lay in the hands of the police state. Even after the martial law which had been imposed in 32 departments ended on 27 March 1852, a

complex of old and new laws facilitated administrative repression and effectively deterred political opposition. Lists of potential opponents were maintained in each department to facilitate further arrests should these be judged to be necessary.

Detailed military contingency plans were prepared to deal with any future mass insurrections in Paris and Lyon. Censorship of the press and the surveillance of former militants and their likely meeting places continued. Control of the press was a major pre-occupation for the authorities, who blamed much of the disorder of the Second Republic on its corrupting influence. The new press law of 17 February 1852 codified the repressive legislation introduced since 1814 – prior authorisation preceding publication, the deposit of caution money to pay fines, stamp duty to increase the cost of newspapers, suspension, etc. – and increased the discretionary powers of the administration. Editors were obliged to engage in rigorous self-censorship if their newspapers were to survive. However, it proved to be easier to suppress opposition newspapers than to create a popular pro-government press. It should be noted, additionally, that respect for legal forms, an ethical code, lack of policemen and sheer inefficiency restricted the activities of the repressive apparatus. The police state of Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, as brutal as it could be on occasion, was to be nothing like the twentieth-century totalitarian state.

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However, to an important degree, its origins in a military coup would determine attitudes towards the restored imperial regime and its subsequent evolution.

On 20 December 1851, a plebiscite was held on the question of extending the authority of the President of the Republic. This procedure was to be a characteristic of the new regime. Louis-Napoléon was determined to secure a large and positive majority. It was made clear to officials at all levels, from the prefect to the village mayor and road repair man that their continued employment depended upon

enthusiastic campaigning. The essential theme was the choice between

‘civilisation and barbarism, social order and chaos’. The promise was an end to the long mid-century crisis and the inauguration of an era of order, peace and

prosperity. At the same time, every effort was made to intimidate opponents and to prevent them from campaigning. The result was predictable. A substantial positive majority was obtained, due in part to coercion but, primarily, because many voters were genuinely frightened at the prospect of further revolution, and large numbers were attracted by the prospect of a strong and active Bonapartist regime. About 7, 500, 000 voted ‘yes’; 640, 000 ‘no’; and 1, 500, 000 abstained. A large negative vote was characteristic of all the major cities with 80, 000 ‘no’ votes and 75, 000

abstentions countering only 132, 000 ‘yes’ votes in Paris. In the Nord, significant opposition was expressed in Lille with its socio-professionally mixed population, but in the mining and metallurgical centres of Anzin and Denain, 79 per cent and 84 per cent respectively of the overwhelmingly working class electorate voted

‘yes’. Two forms of opposition manifested themselves. A negative vote was

returned, especially among the urban professional and lower middle classes, and skilled and literate workers in areas of republican strength in the north, east and south-east. Paradoxically, the exceptions in these areas were places in which insurrections had occurred. There, terrified conservatives voted ‘yes’ in gratitude to Bonaparte while republican sympathisers did the same to escape further

repression. The other form of opposition was abstention, particularly evident in parts of the west and in Provence, where popular Legitimism and clericalism remained strong. Even then most Legitimists voted ‘yes’ (as did many former moderate republicans) and largely out ora concern for social order. The

conservative newspaper,
L’Union bourguignonne
(16 December 1851), warned that ‘those who vote NO declare themselves accomplices in the crimes of the demagogues’.

In symbolic promise of things to come, the plebiscite was followed by the

replacement of the image of the Republic on coins and postage stamps by that of 23

‘His Imperial Highness the Prince-President’ as he was now to be officially designated. On 1 January 1852 at a solemn service of thanksgiving in Notre Dame, the Archbishop of Paris called for God’s blessing on the regime using language which made it seem as if the Empire already existed and on 10 May new flags bearing the imperial eagle were distributed to the army. Relieved of their terror, the upper classes celebrated the carnival in 1852 with renewed enthusiasm. Within a year, following a similar, orchestrated campaign, a second plebiscite was held in far less dramatic circumstances (on 21–22 November 1852) with voters asked to approve the re-establishment of the hereditary empire. During a tour of the south in October, the future Emperor promised peace, order and prosperity. These themes, together with that of reconciliation, were taken up successfully by officials throughout the country. Again, open opposition was not tolerated. While 7, 824, 000 voters supported the proposed constitutional change, only 253, 000 voted against and 1, 500, 000 abstained – as before, mainly in the towns, in some ‘red’

areas of the south and in Legitimist dominated zones of the west. The Second Empire was proclaimed on 2 December 1852, a propitious date, the anniversary not only of Louis-Napoléon’s own successful coup, but of both the coronation of his uncle in 1804 and the first Emperor’s great victory at Austerlitz in 1805.

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3

The authoritarian Empire

Objectives and achievements

The Second Empire would see major structural changes in the economy and society as well as innovations in the system of government. One of the fundamental

questions to concern us will be the effect of these on political behaviour; another will be how to escape from the deforming prism of republican historiography. The intentions of Napoléon III, whose personal power had been greatly reinforced by the coup, were obviously of considerable significance. As we have seen, the reputation of this strange man, inspired by a belief in his own destiny, suffered irreparably from the catastrophic defeat of the French armies in 1870. However, he cannot be dismissed (as he was by some contemporaries) as ‘Napoléon the Little’

(Hugo). The objectives of the new Emperor, his Napoleonic ideas, were clear. He intended to depoliticise government through the establishment of a strong and stable executive power capable of promoting social and economic modernisation and to ‘close the era of revolution by satisfying the legitimate needs of the people’.

The means to be employed included the restoration of the political and

administrative institutions conceived by Napoléon I, together with severe curbs imposed upon the activities of political ‘parties’. The Emperor, his authority legitimised by the popular vote, would serve as an almost mystical link between the state and society. Popular sovereignty would itself survive through the plebiscitory process and eventually, once social stability had been secured, through the gradual and partial re-establishment of parliamentary institutions. In the meantime, a senate made up of 180 senators was appointed, named for life, to include senior 25

officials and military officers, representatives of the Church and of business, together with the imperial princes and various other dignitaries. Its role was, through the mechanism of the
senatus consultum
, to interpret and amend the constitution. It was also supposed to serve as the guardian of liberty by ensuring that laws were not introduced contrary to the constitution, to religion, morality, individual liberty and equality, to the sanctity of property and the security of France. In theory, the Senate then possessed considerable power; in practice, composed as it was of aged pensioners of the regime, it would do little to oppose the wishes of the government. Of far greater importance was the
Corps législatif
.

With just over 260 members, elected by manhood suffrage, it had the right to vote on legislative and taxation proposals, but not to initiate legislation. Even during its most authoritarian phase the regime was never able to ignore entirely the opinions of a body, with potential power, made up of representatives of the social elite.

Careful selection of candidates was thus seen as essential. The responsibility for actually drafting laws and administrative regulations, and for discussing

amendments proposed by the
Corps législatif
rested with the 40 or 50 members, primarily jurists, of the Council of State (
Conseil d’Etat
). This, the supreme administrative tribunal, now received considerable political power, although it could be held in check with comparative ease by a government which was able to dismiss its members at will from their lucrative positions. Furthermore, its powers were resented bitterly by those whose legislative efforts it criticised – ministers, civil servants and deputies.

The regime was fortunate in that it coincided with a worldwide period of

economic growth. Many of its ‘achievements’ might be regarded as simply

coincidental. However, it would probably be more accurate to accept that the impact of trends in the international economy were reinforced internally by substantial government-inspired efforts to increase infrastructure investment, especially in roads, railways and the electric telegraph, as the means of achieving a transport ‘revolution’. The railway network which had been composed of 3, 230

kilometres in discontinuous sections in 1851 had expanded to a network of 17, 200

kilometres by 1870. Furthermore, road links to railway stations had also been substantially improved. This, along with a marked reduction in tariff protection, secured through the negotiation of customs treaties with the country’s main trading partners, beginning with Britain in 1860, was intended to ensure the development of more integrated and increasingly competitive markets for both agricultural and manufactured goods. The aim was to create a business environment conducive to investment in modern technology, with capital provided by new investment banks 26

and investment facilitated by making it easier in law to establish joint stock companies with limited liability. Substantial capital was also to be mobilised in order to finance the creation of a capital city fit for the empire, with broad boulevards flanked by new commercial and residential buildings, allowing easy movement between the railway stations and facilitating, if necessary, the

maintenance of military control through strategically placed barracks, fewer obstacles to cavalry charges and clear fields of fire for artillery. Similar (if less ambitious) developments graced most provincial cities. Along with enhanced

opportunities for profit, it was hoped that large-scale investment would provide employment opportunities, greater security and improved rewards for the masses and, in so doing, contribute to the preservation of social stability. The objectives were clear, but economic and social modernisation takes time. Additionally, it was impossible to insulate the country against the vagaries of the international economic cycle or climatically induced harvest failures, as well as the confidence-sapping impact of international or internal political crises. As a result, these far-reaching economic and social objectives were attained only partially. Moreover, governmental intervention in economic affairs provoked considerable hostility from a variety of special interest groups; neither did it follow that the improved living conditions would automatically promote a greater sense of loyalty to the regime. Even so, the imperial years saw considerable progress in terms of

economic modernisation and the improvement of living standards. This was

symbolised by the virtual disappearance, as a consequence of market integration resulting from improved communications of the age-old subsistence crises, of the successive dearths which had caused so much misery and widespread popular

protest as recently as 1845–7 and again in 1853–6. The continuing improvements in agricultural productivity as well as increased migration to the cities had the effect of easing population pressure on the resources of the countryside. In contrast with the long period of price depression from 1817 to 1851, the prices paid to farmers for their produce rose almost continuously in response to growing urban demand.

However, if the various forms of farm income – profits, rents and wages – were all rising, this did not eliminate social tension in the countryside. Particularly in the 1860s, as the long established situation in which rising population densities had reinforced the power of the social elites who controlled access to scarce resources came towards an end, peasant farmers and even agricultural labourers clearly were developing a greater sense of independence. In the towns, too, the rapid growth of employment opportunities ensured that workers’ real incomes began to rise from the late 1850s for the first time since the end of the First Empire. Although the living 27