One Hundred Victories (22 page)

BOOK: One Hundred Victories

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Finally, in January 2012, in a video teleconference with BK, Haas and Scaparrotti appealed again for the minister to relent. Haas did not believe they should offer any further concessions, and he was ready to sacrifice his decade-long relationship with the minister. They had always been able to reach some compromise, but Haas felt this was a Rubicon that could not be crossed. If the program were utterly politicized, it could become a tool for the possible regeneration of a civil war. Haas said no, he would not accede to BK’s demands. “I told him that there was no insurgency there, and I was not going to put teams there,” Haas recounted. “I told him that the south had to survive to be part of Afghanistan.”
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BK blew up. “Chris is no longer my friend,” he shouted at the Americans. “From now on I am only going to talk to General Allen.”

Haas had drawn a line in the sand, and he was ready to stand by it. In the end, after consultations up the chain of command, Haas and his staff were told to hold their noses and produce a plan for a new compromise. They were to build “accelerated ALP” forces in four districts in the north: special operations teams would be sent north to train recruits, but only for four months. Afghan officials were to complete the vetting and have all required equipment ready. In return, the draft memorandum requested that the minister approve the southern districts awaiting his validation. When he sent the memorandum forward, Allen left the reciprocal demand out, perhaps because he was dealing with the fallout from the Koran burnings and Karzai’s denunciations.

Haas’s staff had to grit their teeth and move ahead with their end of the bargain.

Haas’s ops chief, Heinz Dinter, was glum. “We are putting the program at risk by making this compromise,” he said. The entire staff was distressed to see even these four districts depart from the standards. Problems emanating from the north could taint the whole program, and even worse, the concession could be used as a precedent for further diversions of effort. At the moment, the operators had no choice but to salute and move forward, trying their best to make the plan work. Haas had tried his best but was unable to influence the Tajik perspective on such an existential matter. This powerful faction in the Afghan government would ultimately have to decide whether it trusted Pashtuns enough to embrace the vision of self-defense in the south. If the leaders of Afghanistan did not buy into the core purpose of the initiative, it would falter over the long term. Moreover, it would bode ill for the country’s much-needed reconciliation. Recounting the showdown and the rupture in his relationship with BK, Haas hid his emotions as usual. “The Afghans get a vote,” he said gruffly.
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