Scipio Africanus (17 page)

“ The most efficient and steadfast of his troops he had held in rear at an unusual distance in order that, anticipating and observing from afar the course of the battle, they might with undiminished strength and spirit influence the battle at the right moment. If he, who had never yet suffered defeat, after taking every possible step to ensure victory, yet failed to do so, we must pardon him. For there are times when Fortune counteracts the plans of valiant men, and again at times, as the proverb says, ‘ A brave man meets another braver still,' as we may say happened in the case of Hannibal.”

Using this proverb in the sense that Polybius clearly meant it, here in a brief phrase is our verdict on the battle—a master of war had met a greater master. Hannibal had no Flaminius or Varro to facet. No longer was a complacent target offered him by a Roman general, conservative and ignorant of the “ sublime part of war ” like those who first met Hannibal in Italy, unwilling recipients of his instructional course. At Zama he faced a man whose vision had told him that in a cavalry superiority lay
the master-card of battle ; whose diplomatic genius had led him long since to convert, in spirit and in effect, Hannibal's source of cavalry to his own use ; whose strategic skill had lured the enemy to a battle-ground where this newly gained power could have full scope and offset his own numerical weakness in the other arms.

Rarely has any commander so ably illustrated the meaning of that hackneyed phrase “ gaining and retaining the initiative.” From the day when Scipio had defied the opinion of Fabius, monument of orthodoxy, and moved on Carthage instead of on the “ main armed forces of the enemy,”
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he had kept the enemy dancing to his tune. Master in the mental sphere, he had compassed their moral disintegration to pave the way for the final act—their overthrow in the physical sphere. That this followed is less remarkable than the manner of its execution. Scipio is almost unique in that as a tactician he was as consummate an artist as in his strategy. Of few of the great captains can it be said that their tactical rivalled their strategical skill, or the reverse. Napoleon is an illustration. But in battle as in the wider field Scipio achieved
that balance and blend of the mental, moral, and physical sphere which distinguishes him in the roll of history. Thus it came about that on the battlefield of Zama Scipio not only proved capable of countering each of Hannibal's points, but turned the latter's own weapon back upon himself to his mortal injury. Scan the records of time and we cannot find another decisive battle where two great generals gave of their best. Arbela, Cannæ, Pharsalus, Breitenfeld, Blenheim, Leuthen, Austerlitz, Jena, Waterloo, Sedan—all were marred by fumbling or ignorance on one side or the other.

CHAPTER XII.

AFTER ZAMA.

THE completeness of the victory left no room for a strategic pursuit, but Scipio did not linger in developing the moral exploitation of his victory. “ Concluding that he ought to bring before Carthage everything which could increase the consternation already existing there ... he ordered Gneius Octavius to conduct the legions thither by land; and setting out himself from Utica with the fresh fleet of Lentulus added to his former one, made for the harbour of Carthage ” (Livy). The immediate move achieved its object, a bloodless capitulation, thus crowning his eight years' fulfilment of the law of economy of force by saving the costly necessity of a siege.

A short distance from the harbour of Carthage he was met by a ship decked with fillets and branches of olive. “ There were ten deputies, the leading men in the State, sent at the instance of Hannibal to solicit peace, to whom, when they
had come up to the stern of the general's ship, holding out the badges of suppliants and entreating the protection and compassion of Scipio, the only answer given was that they must come to Tunis, whither he would move his camp. After taking a view of Carthage, not with any particular object of acquainting himself of it, but to dispirit the enemy, he returned to Tunis, and also recalled Octavius there ” (Livy). The army on its way had received word that Vermina, the son of Syphax, was on his way to the succour of Carthage with a large force. But Octavius, employing a part of the infantry and all the cavalry, intercepted their march and routed them with heavy loss, his cavalry blocking all the routes of escape.

As soon as the camp at Tunis was pitched, thirty envoys arrived from Carthage, and to play on their fears they were kept waiting a day without an answer. At the renewed audience next day Scipio began by stating briefly that the Romans had no call to treat them with leniency, in view not only of their admission that they had begun the war, but of their recent treachery in violating a written agreement they had sworn to observe.

“ But for our own sake and in consideration of the fortune of war and of the common ties of humanity we have decided to be clement and
magnanimous. This will be evident to you also, if you estimate the situation rightly. For you should not regard it as strange if we impose hard obligations on you or if we demand sacrifices of you, but rather it should surprise you if we grant you any favours, since Fortune owing to your own misconduct has deprived you of any right to pity or pardon, and placed you at the mercy of your enemies.” Then he stated first the indulgences, and next the conditions of peace —from that day onward the Romans would abstain from devastation or plunder; the Carthaginians were to retain their own laws and customs, and to receive no garrison; Carthage was to be restored all the territory in Africa that had been hers before the war, to keep all her flocks, herds, slaves, and other property. The conditions were—that reparation was to be made to the Romans for the injuries inflicted during the truce; the transports and cargoes then seized were to be given up ; all prisoners and deserters were to be handed over. The Carthaginians were to surrender all their warships except ten triremes, all their elephants, and not to tame any more—Scipio evidently held these in more respect than some modern military historians do. The Carthaginians were not to make war at all on any nation outside Africa, and on no nation in Africa without consulting
Rome. They were to restore to Masinissa, within boundaries that should subsequently be settled, all the territory and property that had belonged to him or his forbears. They were to furnish the Roman army with sufficient corn for three months, and pay the troops until the peace mission had returned from Rome. They were to pay an indemnity of ten thousand talents of silver, in equal annual instalments spread over fifty years. Finally, they were to give as surety a hundred hostages, to be chosen by Scipio from their young men between fourteen and thirty years. The restoration of the transports was to be an immediate condition of a truce, “ otherwise they would have no truce, nor any hope of peace.”

202 B.C.—1919 A.D. ! What moderation compared with the conditions of Versailles. Here was true grand strategy—the object a better peace, a peace of security and prosperity. Here were sown no seeds of revenge. The necessary guarantees of security were obtained by the surrender of the Carthaginian fleet, by the hostages, and by placing a strong and loyal watchdog in Masinissa next door to Carthage. But they were kept down to the minimum both of cost to the conqueror and hardship to the conquered. This cheaply afforded security paved the way for the future prosperity of Rome, and
at the same time made possible, justly, the revival of Carthage's prosperity.

The vindication of Scipio's generous and foresighted moderation lies in the fifty years of peace, unspotted on the Carthaginian side, which followed Zama. And had the Roman politicians been as wise and dispassionate as Scipio this peace would of a certainty have endured, with Carthage a prosperous and placid satellite of Rome, and the immortal phrase,
Delenda est Carthago,
instead of being translated into dreadful fact, would have been no more than the transitory hobby-horse of a senile “ die-hard,” a jest for a generation and then forgotten. Moreover, had the execution of the treaty terms been left with Scipio, there would not have been that malignant distortion of its clauses whereby constant complaints, but no more, were wrung from a long-suffering State. Even as it was, despite these constant petty inflictions, Carthage became as prosperous and populous as in the height of its power, and only by deliberate and outrageous provocation—the order to the citizens to destroy their own city—could these patient traders be forced into the revolt that afforded the desired pretext for their obliteration.

Let it be added that the moderation of Scipio called forth the response of Hannibal, and the true peace initiated by the former was being
faithfully fulfilled by the latter, until the unrelenting hatred of the Roman Senate drove him into exile from the country whose peaceful prosperity he was rebuilding. Not for the last time in history, the vision and humanity of two great rival soldiers gave a shining example of true policy to revengeful and narrow-minded politicians. Yet for this constructive wisdom Hannibal paid by exile and forced suicide, Scipio by ending his days in voluntary exile from a State that had long since “ dropped the pilot.” His envious and narrow political rivals in the Senate could not refuse to ratify his peace terms in face of his influence over the people, and were for the moment too conscious of relief in this happy ending of a ruinous and prolonged struggle. But as the memory of danger passed, and also of how narrowly they had escaped, these checks on their hatred waned, and they could not forgive “ the man who had disdained to punish more thoroughly the crime of having made Romans tremble.”

When Scipio had announced the terms of peace to the envoys from Carthage, they carried them at once to their Senate. His moderation did not evoke an instant echo in an assembly that was coincidently “ indisposed for peace and unfit for war.” One of the Senators was about to oppose the acceptance of the terms, and had
begun his speech when Hannibal came forward and pulled him down from the tribune. The other members became irate at this breach of senatorial usage, whereupon Hannibal rose again, and, admitting that he had been hasty, asked their pardon for this “ unparliamentary ” conduct, saying, that as they knew, he had left at nine years of age, and returned after thirty-six years' absence on more practical debating. He asked them to dwell rather on his patriotism, for it was due to this that he had offended against senatorial usage. “ It seems to me astounding and quite incomprehensible, that any man who is a citizen of Carthage, and is conscious of the designs that we all individually and as a body have entertained against Rome, does not bless his stars that now he is at the mercy of the Romans he has obtained such lenient terms. If you had been asked but a few days ago what you expected your country to suffer in the event of a Roman victory, you would not have been able even to voice your fears, so extreme were the calamities then in prospect. So now I beg you not to argue the question, but to agree unanimously to the terms, and to pray, all of you, that the Roman people may ratify the treaty.”
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This dust-dispelling breeze of common-sense so cleared their minds that they voted to accept the terms, and the Senate at once sent envoys with instructions to agree to them.

They had some difficulty in complying with the preliminary conditions for the truce, as although they could find the transports they could not return their cargoes, because much of the property was still in the hands of the irreconcilables. The envoys were forced to ask Scipio to accept a monetary compensation, and as he put no obstacles in the way, a three months' truce was settled and granted.

The envoys sent to Rome were chosen from the first men in the State—for the Romans had made it a ground of complaint that the former embassy lacked age and authority,—and they were further recommended to the Roman Senate by the inclusion of Hasdrubal Hædus, a consistent peace advocate and longstanding opponent of the Barcine party. This good impression he, as spokesman, developed by a speech that subtly flattered their dispassionate justice, and while tactfully admitting guilt, toned down its blackness.

The majority of the Senate were clearly in favour of peace, but Lentulus, who had succeeded to Claudius's consulship and also his ambition for cheap glory, protested against the decision
of the Senate, as he had been canvassing to be allotted Africa as his province, and hoped that if he could keep alive the dying embers of the war he might attain his ambition. But this was promptly snuffed out, for when the question was put to the assembly of the people, they unanimously voted that the Senate should make peace, that Scipio should be empowered to grant it, and that he alone should conduct the army home. The Senate therefore agreed accordingly, and on the return of the Carthaginian envoys peace was concluded on the terms set forth by Scipio. The terms were punctually fulfilled, and Scipio ordered the warships, five hundred in number, to be towed out to the open sea and there set on fire—the funeral pyre of Carthaginian supremacy.

Scipio's enemies used in later years to insinuate that the moderation of his terms was due to his fear that harsher conditions might, by prolonging the war, force him to share his glory with a successor. As this vulgar motive has also been hinted at by some historians, it is worth while to stress two facts which utterly demolish the slander. First, the helplessness and passivity of Carthage from that time onward; second, the way the Roman people squashed all attempts to supersede him during this last phase. After Zama, when all Rome was wild with enthusiasm,
no usurper, however pushful, would have stood the least chance of success.

Before leaving Africa, he first saw Masinissa established in his kingdom, and presented him with the lands of Syphax, delaying his own triumph in order to ensure the reward of his loyal assistants. Then at last, his task accomplished, he withdrew his army of occupation, and embarked them for Sicily. On arriving there he sent the bulk of his troops on by sea while he proceeded overland through Italy, one long triumphal procession, for not only did the people of every town turn out to do him honour, but the country folk thronged the roads. On arriving in Rome he “ entered the city in a ‘ triumph ' of unparalleled splendour, and afterwards distributed to each of his soldiers four hundred
asses
out of the spoils.” At this time, too, was born his surname of Africanus, “ the first general who was distinguished by a name derived from the country which he had conquered.” Whether this was bestowed by his soldiers, by his friends, or as a popular nickname is uncertain.